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RESUMEN 
Este artículo discute el efecto de las asignaciones de nivelación diseñadas según el 
esquema RTS sobre el comportamiento de gobiernos subnacionales. En concreto, 
estudiamos los cambios en el coste marginal de los fondos públicos (MCPF) y en las 
condiciones de primer orden para la provisión óptima de un input público. Es de esperar 
que el MCPF se reduzca cuando las transferencias verticales de suma fija sean 
sustituidas por unas del tipo RTS. Sin embargo, este resultado debe matizarse bajo 
ciertas circunstancias. También detectamos que no existe una relación inequívoca 
entre el grado de nivelación fiscal y el coste marginal de proveer un input público y el 
establecimiento de impuestos. La condición de eficiencia productiva en la provisión del 
input público se mantiene para ambos sistemas de nivelación. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses how the state government's behavior is affected when the so-
called Representative Tax System (RTS) equalization scheme is implemented. In 
particular, we study the changes in the marginal cost of the public funds (MCPF), and in 
the first order conditions for the optimal provision of a public input. A reduction in the 
MCPF is to be expected when lump-sum grants are replaced by RTS equalization 
transfers. However, this result has to be qualified under certain assumptions. Also we 
find that there does not exist an unambiguous relationship between the degree of fiscal 
equalization and the marginal cost of providing the public input and the tax setting. 
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Equalization grants are commonly employed in federal countries. The aim
guiding the design of these vertical transfers is principally to provide the
subnational governments enough resources to deliver a determined level of
public spending, regardless their tax capacity. Formulae implemented for
that have been diverse, but a common underlying structure can be found
(Zabalza, 2003). One of the most frequently used equalization schemes is the
so-called Representative Tax System (RTS)1, that attempts to equalize the
diﬀerences in state tax bases taking as reference standard values for tax rate
and tax base.
H o w e v e r ,a ne q u a l i z a t i o ng r a n t ss y s t e ms u c haR T Sc a nb ea n a l y s e di n
light of traditional dilemma eﬃciency versus redistribution. Indeed, equal-
ization transfers can aﬀect negatively eﬃciency of equilibria as long as states
may modify their tax policies in order to inﬂuence on the size of the grant.
There are two channels through which subnational governments can alter the
resources they receive from the equalization system. First one -equalization
rate eﬀect- arises when one or more states have enough market power to
translate the variations in their own tax rates to the standard value used as
benchmark. The sense and the magnitude of this eﬀect obsviously depend
on the size of the state in relation to the remaining jurisdictions, and on its
relative tax ﬁscal capacity.
The second negative implication from RTS is a federal version of the
moral hazard problem: equalization base eﬀect. Indeed, state governments
can reduce their tax base by increasing tax rates and, consequently, to rise
the grant they receive. This situation leads to an overprovision of public
goods because subnational governments perceive a lower marginal cost of
the public funds (MCPF) relative to a lump-sum grant system, in which the
size of the transfer is unaﬀected by state tax decisions, and it does not appear
a substitution eﬀect in the MCPF.
Several papers have dealt with these perverse eﬀects of equalization sys-
tem. Courchene and Beavis (1973) and Bird and Slack (1990) focus on the
risk of manipulating the equalization formula by the subnational govern-
ments. Smart (1998) achieves the conclusion that RTS equalization grants
tend to increase the tax rates set by state governments. Lago (2002) distin-






























sguishes between public consumption and public investment, and concludes
that tax rates are higher with RTS equalization grants under a Leviathan
model.
However, equalization may have positive eﬀects on eﬃciency in federal
systems. Kothenburger (2002) shows the ability of equalization transfers for
correcting tax competition. Similarly, Bucovetsky and Smart (2002) ﬁnd
that although equalization leads to an excessive taxation when tax bases are
elastic, it is able to correct tax competition and ﬁscal externalities.
From an empirical approach, Boessenkol (2002) provides an analysis for
Canada which is consistent with many of the above theoretical predictions.
Esteller and Sole (2002) estimate the impact of RTS grants on Canadian
provinces income tax setting and ﬁnd that tax rates are positively aﬀected
at least in receiving jurisdictions. Baretti et al. (2002) illustrate for German
states the dilemma between eﬃciency and equity coming from the imple-
mentation of a tax revenues equalization system. Dahlby and Warren (2003)
obtain econometric results suggesting that the equalization system may have
aﬀected the Australian states’ choice of tax rates.
This paper aims to translate some results from the above theoretical
literature to the case of public input provision. In particular, we extend the
standard ﬁndings by Smart (1998) to productive public spending, modifying
part of them. Also we discuss the eﬀect of the degree of equalization on
t h em a r g i n a lc o s to fp r o v i d i n gt h ep u b l i ci n p u ta n do nt h et a xs e t t i n g .W e
build a theoretical model based on Boadway and Keen (1996), where per
unit taxes on labor are levied by state governments. A productive public
good is considered in line with Dahlby and Wilson (2003). On this issue,
a distinction is required: while for public goods only the cost in terms of
social welfare by raising revenues with distortionary taxation (the MCPF)
has to be considered, with public inputs aﬀecting tax bases a tax revenue
eﬀect must be taken into account as well (below such a combination of both
concepts is called marginal cost of provision).
Among the main results, we ﬁnd that although is to be expected that the
MCPF lowers when RTS grants are used, the opposite also may occur under
certain assumptions. As a result of this, an infraprovision of the public input
could be attained with RTS transfers with respect to lump-sum, uncondi-
tional grants. A second point is that under a RTS framework there does not
exist an unambiguous relationship between the degree of ﬁscal equalization
and the cost of public funds and the marginal cost of providing the public






























The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model and the diﬀerences in terms of tax rates and FOC between lump-
sum and equalization frameworks. Section 3 discusses how the degree of
equalization aﬀects optimality rules in the provision of public inputs and tax
setting. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The model. Second-best allocations with
equalization grants
Let a federal country consisting of k states indexed by i, i =1 ,2,...,k.
Each state is populated by ni identical households that are assumed to be
completely inmobile. The share of total population living in region i is γi =
ni
N,w h e r eN =
Pk




where xi is a private good used as numeraire and li is labor supplied2.P r o p -
erties of function u(xi,l i) are the standard ones. Representative household





where ωi i st h ew a g er a t ea n dti the per unit tax on labor. Household’s
optimization problem consists of maximizing (1) subject to (2) to yield labor
supply li (ωi − ti) and indirect utility function V (ωi − ti).I ti sa s s u m e dt h a t
l
0
i > 0 and l
00
i < 03. Output in the state is produced using labor services and




where Li = nili. This function satisﬁes the usual assumptions: increasing
in its arguments (FLi > 0, Fgi > 0) and strictly quasiconcave (FLiLi < 0,
2In order to make easier the notation, state is denoted by a subindex when labor is
involved.
3Henceforth, diﬀerentiation is denoted by primes for functions of a single variable, while





























sFgigi < 0 and FLigi > 0)4. Output can be used costlessly as x or g5. Labor
market is perfectly competitive so we can write:
ω





Hence wage rate function is given by ωi (gi,t i,n i). In such a way, some results






















































Again, it is useful to obtain some results for later use:
π
i
























i < 0 (9)
Note that the eﬀect of the public input on rents is ambiguous because
gi increases output (and hence, economic proﬁt) but the productive public
expenditure may also exert a positive impact upon wage rate, reducing rents.
In turn, the inﬂuence of g on wage rate can be decomposed in two parts: a
direct positive eﬀect coming from the higher productivity of labor (FLigi > 0),
and an indirect negative eﬀect arising because additional units of labor are
less productive than the previous ones (FLiLi < 0). The net impact will
depend on the relative magnitude of both eﬀects, which can reinforce or
reduce the unambiguous positive inﬂuence of public input on output (Fgi >
0).
4The way in which the production function is deﬁned is that of Boadway and Keen
(1996) or Dahlby and Wilson (2003). Introducing private capital as argument would lead
to consider capital mobility across jurisdictions and tax competition. Since tax com-
petition induces subnational governments to set ineﬃciently low tax rates, the eﬀect of
equalization could be counterweighed, breaking down our purpose of isolating the impact
of equalization.





























sWe consider two diﬀerent scenarios for state governments: with lump-sum
grants or with equalization transfers. Regional governments behave as Nash
competitors with respect to other regions and levels of government. Given
the heterogeneity in sizes of state population and no mobility of households
across the federation, an asymmetric equilibrium will be attained. First
scenario we take into consideration is characterized by a lump-sum grant
from the federal government to the states. Each region sets its own tax rates
ti on labor and the value of gi to maximize the representative household’s





























i,( 1 0 )
where
−
ei is the per capita lump-sum received by the state. Note that all
economic proﬁts are taxed away by government because they are eﬃcient








































ti =0 , (12)
where µi is the Lagrange’s multiplier. After some manipulation with equa-
tions (11) and (12), using Roy’s identity (with λ
i as the private marginal
utility of income), and (6) and (9), the second best condition for the optimal
























6Wildasin (1986) demonstrates that it is relevant to distinguish between to maximize
the per capita utility or the total utility.
7We establish here that the country is under-populated in order to avoid that a tax on
rents may suﬃce to ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best level of public good (Wildasin, 1986).
8Sharing tax on pure economic proﬁts between diﬀerent levels of government would
substantially complicate our analysis. Not only vertical tax externalities would have to
be considered but also vertical expenditures externalities as well (Dahlby and Wilson,
2003). In this context, many of the eﬀects of vertical externalities would overlap with





























sL H So fe q u a t i o n( 1 3 )s h o w st h es u mo fm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁts received by all
households living in the state i from one additional unit of gi.R H S o f
e q u a t i o n( 1 3 )i st h em a r g i n a lc o s to fp r o v i d i n gt h ep u b l i ci n p u t( M C P ) .I n
this regard, it may be worth noting that two terms can be distinguished here.
The ﬁrst one is the marginal cost of the public funds (MCPF); the second
one is the marginal production cost net of tax revenue eﬀe c tt h a ta r i s e ss o
long as gi may aﬀect positively or negatively the tax base (MPCT). Whereas
i nt h ec a s eo fac o n s u m p t i o np u b l i cg o o dt h eM C P Fa n dt h eM P Ca r ee q u a l ,
a distinction is required when a public input is considered.
If Roy’s identity is used again in the LHS of expression (13), and expres-
sions (5) and (8) are inserted in (13), manipulation gives:
Fgi =1 ,( 1 4 )
that is, the production eﬃciency condition for the provision of public inputs
(Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). It means that the production eﬀects of the
public input are equal to its marginal production cost, though distortionary
(but optimally set) taxation is used. At this point, this model does not
deviate from the results obtained by Feehan and Matsumoto (2002), and
Dahlby and Wilson (2003).
The introduction of a RTS equalization grant may distort the state gov-
ernments’ behavior. Consider now that a new vertical transfer is implemented
in favor of the regional governments. Unlike the above lump-sum grant, the
new per capita transfer is deﬁned to equalize states’ tax capacities, so its






















ili,( 1 6 )
where α ∈ (0,1] is the policy parameter determining the extent in which
the equalization system responds to deviations of region i’s tax base from
the standard tax base,
−
t is the standard tax rate, and
−
l is the standard tax
base. This form for the equalization grant is usual in the literature and it
is straightforward to show that is budget-balancing. Each state government


































sSubstituting the new expression for ei into the state budget constraint




















































ti =0 , (18)
where ηi is the Lagrange multiplier. Manipulation gives the condition for the



































In essence, the economic interpretation of this expression is the same than
before. Some results on the behavior of the state government can be achieved
under the RTS equalization system.
Proposition 1 Let ti
0 and ti
1 be the tax rates solving government i‘s problem
with a lump-sum grant and with a RTS equalization grant, respectively. If
the tax base li (wi − ti) is non-increasing in ti,t h e nti
1 ≥ ti
0 (Smart, 1998).
Proof. See the proof of the proposition 1 by Smart (1998). The tax base







< 0), given (6) and the
assumptions of the model.
Proposition 2 Let ti
1 and
−
t1 be the tax rate solving government i’s problem
with a RTS equalization grant and the standard tax rate in the federation,
respectively. Case a) if ti
1 ≤
−
αt1, the MCPF with a RTS equalization system
is lower than with a lump-sum grants system. Case b) if ti
1 >
−
αt1,t h eM C P F
with a RTS equalization system is higher than with a lump-sum grants system
if ε>
−
αt1,w h e r eε is the increase in the tax rate when the lump-sum grant
is substituted by a RTS equalization grant.
Proof. Case a) It is straightforward from the expression for the MCPF with
















































t1are higher or equal than ti
0 and
−











0 +ε − α
−














αt1), the MCPF under lump-sum transfers may be below
the MCPF with RTS equalization grants. It will happen when a substantial
increase in state tax rate takes place by so much to overcome state tax
rate with lump-sum grants, even after considering the eﬀective reduction in
taxation given by the standard tax rate in equalization.
Case b) of proposition 2 shows that an increase in tax rates can be com-
patible with elevations in the MCPF. In other words, endogeneity of tax
policy with respect to equalization policy and to the magnitude of MCPF
is not so straightforward as might seemed. Indeed, in equilibrium, if tax
rate rises by so much to compensate the income eﬀect generated by the RTS
equalization system, a higher MCPF is to be expected9. Therefore, propo-
sition 2 admits the possibility that infraprovision of public spending takes
place when a RTS scheme is set because a higher MCPF may desincentive
public input provision.
From another perspective, case b) is a good illustration of the diﬀerent
views that can be obtained regarding the study of optimality rules and ﬁrst
order conditions versus the investigation into the optimal levels of policy
variables. Indeed, for case b), former approach implies an increment in a
part of the MCP, and consequently a pressure towards a decrease in tax rates,
while the latter one involves an increase in the level of taxation according to
Smart (1998). Anyway, both circumstances are compatible.
Deﬁnition of the equalization system and above proposition yield the
following two results:
Corollary 1 to Proposition 2 If the tax rate of region i with respect
to the standard one is below equalization parameter α,r e g i o ni receives a
negative RTS grant.











































This refers to a particular situation of case a) in proposition 2. Corollary
1 suggests that with a determined tax eﬀort, equalization system not only
induce to higher tax rates through a substitution eﬀect in the MCPF, but
also can lead to a negative income eﬀect (from a negative grant) reinforcing
the trend towards overprovision of public inputs. In a diﬀerent way to Smart
(1998), our model does not require a quasi-linear utility function in public
spending or the comparison between a RTS equalization system and no grants
scheme, in order to get that both substitution and income eﬀects go in the
same sense.
Corollary 2 to Proposition 2 When the MCPF increases by substituing
lump-sum grants for RTS equalizations transfers, the tax rate of region i is
above the standard tax rate.
Proof. According to proposition 2, case b, the MCPF increases when ε>
−












must be bigger than 1 if ε>
−
αt1 h a st ob ef u l ﬁlled, ∀α ∈ (0,1].
Corollary 2 additionally characterizes the situation in which the MCPF
goes up. In such a context, state governments receive a positive equalization
grant as long as their tax bases are below the standard ones. It should be
noted that a state tax rate higher than
−
t1 does not always coincide with an
elevation of the MCPF; it only happens under the assumptions of case b) in
proposition 2.
It is straightforward to show that eﬃciency production condition is also
fulﬁlled in the provision of public inputs when a RTS equalization system is
used. However, as Feehan and Matsumoto (2002) and Dahlby and Wilson
(2003) point out, it does not imply the same level of public inputs. On the
other hand, in line with Blackorby and Brett (2000) and Kotsogiannis and
Makris (2002), this is an indication that considering production eﬃciency as
criterion for assessing optimality in federal systems may be inappropiate10.





























s3 Redistribution through equalization and state
tax policy
Degree of redistribution is a key issue by designing ﬁscal equalization schemes.
In such a way, changes in parameter α have consequences on tax settings and
states’ behavior. Kothenburger (2002) studies the eﬀe c to ft h a tp a r a m e t e ro n
state tax rate describing several scenarios according to the size of the region.
Buettner (2004) analyses the impact of redistribution through equalization
on the taxing eﬀort of German local jurisdictions. Here we are interested
in knowing the inﬂuence of the degree of ﬁscal equalization on the marginal
cost of providing the public input (the RHS of expression (19)) -as a whole
and distinguishing its two components-, and on the state tax setting.




αt1,i n c r e a s e si nα are followed by decreases in the MCPF.






























, where indexes denot-
ing states have been eliminated for convenience in notation. After algebra

































¶2 .T h e
sign of this expression is not determined, and hence the eﬀect of α on the
MCPF is ambiguous. By contrast, if we set that ti
1 1
−
αt1,a n dg i v e nt h a t
∂g
∂α > 0,t h es i g ni sn e g a t i v e .
On this issue, we move away from the methodology followed by Buettner
(2004), who discusses on the basis of direct changes in the MCPF but ignoring
indirect eﬀects from equalization resources on public spending, and hence on
the variables involved in the expression of the MCPF. In other words, as
Kothenburger (2002) does, we consider that parameter α has an impact on
public spending (
∂g
∂α 6=0 ), and consequently it aﬀects tax base elasticities.
Another issue that is worth to note is the inﬂuence of α on the marginal
production cost of the public input net of tax revenue eﬀect (MPCT), i. e.,

































αt1 and the eﬀect of g on economic proﬁti sn o n - i n c r e a s i n g( πi
gigi ≤ 0),
increases in α a r ef o l l o w e db yi n c r e a s e si nt h eM P C T .

































00 < 0, ωgg < 0 (by the assumptions of the production function) and the
sign of πgg is indetermined, nothing can be said about the sign of this partial
derivative. However, if two conditions are imposed: ti
1 1 αt1 and πi
gigi ≤ 0,
manipulation in that expression gives a positive sign.
Second condition requiring πg to be non-increasing in g is not certainly
a very restrictive assumption. Indeed, a production function such a Cobb-
Douglas allows to achieve this situation only imposing a bounded value for
the third cross-partial derivative with respect to labor and public input.
Intuition behind the result of proposition 4 is related to the impact of α
upon the tax revenue eﬀect. Regarding that increases in α lead to rises in
g, a variation in the equalization parameter can aﬀect tax revenue eﬀect in
a double way. First, public input provision elevates tax base, and hence it
reduces the MPCT. Second, a higher tax base lowers entitlement payments
received from equalization system, rising the MPCT. Hence, it is not clear
which the ﬁnal impact of α on the MPCT will be.11
As a result of both ambiguities, it is straightforward to show that the eﬀect
of parameter α on state tax setting is unknown. Contrary to Kothenburger
(2002), next Proposition states formally this result.
Proposition 5 In a model with public input provision and tax base equal-
ization, it is not possible to elucidate the sign of the eﬀe c to fc h a n g e si nα
on state tax rate.
Proof. Using Roy’s identity in the LHS of expression (19) and applying the



















11Moreover, it must be noted that the reasoning followed in the proposition 4 considers





























sAlthough the second order condition of the government optimization
problem guarantees a negative denomin a t o r ,t h es i g ni si n d e t e r m i n e di nt h e
numerator due to the statements from proposition 3 and 4.
While Kothenburger (2002) detects a positive relationship between α and
ti,o u rm o d e lﬁnds that the degree of equalization captured by parameter α
may reduce marginally the MCPF but the impact on the MPCT may be
the opposite, so the combined eﬀect is not obvious. In such a way, policy-
makers must be aware that increasing the redistribution component of the
equalization grant does not lead to higher tax rates necessarily.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s and further research
One of the most important states’ revenues sources comes from the vertical
transfers implemented by federal government. These grants can be designed
in diﬀerent ways, and the so-called RTS equalization grants are ones of the
most frequently used. The main objective of the RTS equalization schemes
is providing enough resources to subcental levels of government, regardless
their tax capacities but taking their tax eﬀorts into consideration.
Although RTS revenue equalization grants are able to reduce some inef-
ﬁciencies linked to the federal structure of the countries, this paper aims to
highlight the likely ineﬃciencies derived from the implementation of these
vertical grants. In particular, we study how the conditions for the optimal
provision of public inputs are aﬀected when a RTS equalization system is
used instead of lump-sum transfers, and also the consequences in terms of
FOC coming from increasing the degree of ﬁscal equalization.
Our model consists of diﬀerent state governments providing a public input
and behaving as Nash competitors. These governments obtain resources from
labor taxes, proﬁt taxes and grants given by federal government as well. In
s u c haw a y ,w eh a v ec o m p a r e dt w od i ﬀerent scenarios: lump-sum grants and
a RTS equalization system. As was proved by Smart (1998), this paper also
ﬁnds that state tax rates are higher in the equalization framework. However,
we admit the possibility that the MCPF increases when RTS transfers are
considered. It allows to show that the traslation from the discussion on
optimality rules to the optimal levels is not straightforward. Also in this
part we provide a suﬃcient condition for deﬁning a negative grant for the
state, and information about the relative tax eﬀort by a regional government





























sSecondly, we have studied the impacts of modifying the parameter α on
some relevant variables involved in the optimal conditions. At this regard,
we have shown that nothing can be said about the sign of the eﬀect of α on
the state tax rate setting. It is caused by the opposite behavior of the MCPF
and the marginal cost of production net of tax revenue eﬀect (MPCT) with
respect to the degree of ﬁscal equalization. Hence, the dilemma between
eﬃciency and redistribution must be qualiﬁed when RTS grants are used
to ﬁnance public inputs, because it is not straightforward that increasing
equalization leads to eﬃciency losses.
This paper suggests a couple of policy implications. First one highlights
the relevance of the degree of equalization on the eﬃciency of equilibria. In
particular, we have seen that the magnitude of α determines, among others,
whether a state receives a positive grant or not. In such a way, policy-makers
must be aware that a high equalization can amplify the overprovision of pub-
lic inputs in a sense of adding a negative income eﬀect to the substitution
eﬀect derived from the RTS transfers. Secondly, and contrary to the case of
consumption public goods, there does not exist a clear theoretical relation-
ship between the degree of equalization and the tax setting; in fact, federal
government by deﬁning equalization schemes should pay attention upon the
sign of the tax revenue eﬀect because reforms of equalization formula not
only aﬀect the MCPF but also the impact of public inputs on tax revenues
and, consequently, on the optimality of the equilibrium.
Further research on this issue can be initiated. Given that some of the
results are theoretically ambiguous, it could be useful to test them empiri-
cally. Particularly, a special interest can be found in determining whether a
more intense equalization leads to higher state tax rates when the provision
of public inputs is involved. Other extensions from this paper can consist of
broadening the theoretical framework here used. Fiscal competiton (through
taxes on mobile bases and public spending as well), vertical externalities (as a
result of sharing taxes or linked to public expenditure with spillovers towards
other levels of government) or assuming a Stackelberg behavior for federal
government are interesting examples for such as theoretical extensions. Fi-
nally, as a suggestion provided by a referee, above discussion could be carried
out mainly in terms of levels of public inputs and tax rates, instead of op-
timality rules; on this issue, more details on speciﬁc functional forms would
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